Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Purdue CIBER Working Papers

Krannert Graduate School of Management

1-1-1996

Determinants of International and Intercultural
Human Resource Control: The Case of Taiwanese
Subsidiaries int he People's Republic of China
Bih-Shiaw Jaw
National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan

John Hannon
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp
Jaw, Bih-Shiaw and Hannon, John, "Determinants of International and Intercultural Human Resource Control: The Case of Taiwanese
Subsidiaries int he People's Republic of China" (1996). Purdue CIBER Working Papers. Paper 112.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp/112

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Determinants of International and Intercultural Human Resource
Control: The Case of Taiwanese Subsidiaries in the People's
Republic of China

Bih-Shiaw Jaw
National Sun Yat-Sen University
John M. Hannon
Purdue University

96-006

Determinants of International and Intercultural Human Resource
Control: The Case of Taiwanese Subsidiaries in the People's
Republic of China

Bih-Shiaw Jaw
National Sun Yat-Sen University
John M. Hannon
Purdue University

96-006

Center for International Business Education and Research
Purdue University
Krannert Graduate School of Management
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
Phone: (317) 494-4463
FAX: (317) 494-9658

Da.dminants of International and Intercultural HR Control 60611.doc page 1

Determinants of International and Intercultural Human Resource Control:
The Case of Taiwanese Subsidiaries in the People's Republic of China

Bih-Shiaw Jaw
National Sun Vat-Sen University
Kaohsiung, Taiwan
886 7 322 4395 v
886 7 532 6320 f

John Hannon
Krannert Graduate School of Management
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana 47906 USA
317-494-5871 v
317-494-9658 f
hannon@mgmt.purdue.edu

·

;.'

"

,.

~:

.

Drt~ants of International and IntL'n:ultural HR Control 60611.doc page Z

Determinants of International and Intercultural Human Resource Control:
The Case of Taiwanese Subsidiaries in the People's Republic of China
ABSTRACT

This study develops a framework to categorize international and intercultural human .
resource (IHR) control at" the subsidiary level across cultures. The effects of interorganizational
interdependencies, competitive strategies, and cultural differences on the three different
dimensions ofIHR control (input, behavior, and output) were studied using a sample of 100
Taiwanese subsidiaries operating in the People's Republic of China. The most notable
relationships that were found include a robust association between a low cost competition
strategy and the three dimensions of IHR control and the impact of cultural differences on one
type of control.
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Within the last decade, People's of Republic of China (PRC) has experienced unprecedented economic
growth. During this time, it has had the highest average growth rate (above 10% per year) of any economy in the
world. Due to its Open Door Policy, the PRC have imported very much capital, technology and management from
foreign countries to help this economic explosion [Von Glinow & Teagarden, 1988; Gallagher, 1995]. According
to Shin Hwa Newspaper Corporation [1995], it has become the most robust developing country in attracting
foreign investment in 1995 (37,000 cases in 1995). Shin Hwa reports that these foreign direct investments (FDI)
came primarily from Hong Kong (202 billion USD), Taiwan (33.9 billion USD) and America (24.9 billion USD) in
1994. In many of the FDI cases in the PRC, the industrial technologies have been transferred with relative success.
Alternatively, human resource management (HRM) transfers seem to encounter much difficulty. In part, this is
attributable to many cultural differences [Mc Laughlin, 1987; Von Glinow & Teagarden, 1988; Bucknall, 1994].
Therefore, it seems appropriate to study the effect of the international and intercultural HRM (IHRM) on FDI
strategies in the PRe.
Taiwan, a major FDI participant in the PRC, has a tense political relationship with PRe. At the same
time, it also has a very important economic relationship with the PRC. Due to the same language and similar
cultures, the PRC is becoming the most preferred partner for FDI. Further, many multinational corporations
(MNCs), such as Philips Electronics, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Alcatel Telecommunication, manage their PRC
subsidiaries by importing managers from their Taiwan subsidiaries. Although the use of same language fosters the
tight economic relationship between Taiwan and PRC, there are still some cultural differences between them
because of ideological, historical, political, economic, and social welfare differences. An empirical study on the
international and intercultural HRM (IHRM) of Taiwanese companies operating in the PRC should shed some
light on how HR philosophies, policies, and practices can be shared more easily.
International and intercultural HRM in MNCs has been increasingly mentioned as playing an essential
role in the control of operations in cross-culture context [Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Prahalad & Doz, 1981;
Egelhoff, 1984; Jaeger, 1983, Pucik & Katz, 1986; Martinez & Ricks, 1989]. The most recent stream of research in
this area has focused on how HRM strategy fits into the firm's overall business strategy. Although studies have
suggested that strategic context influences integrated human resources practices, scholars know very little about
how separate HRM practices fit into the overall strategic context. In addition, a variety of typologies have been
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devised to differentiate rHRM. They include: control systems [Egelhoff, 1984; Doz & Prahalad, 1984; Baliga &
Jaeger, 1984; Pucik & Katz, 1986; Martinez, & Jaril1o, 1989]. Yet, a cybernetic model of control [Snel1, 1992]
may provide a broad characterization of global HRM that could be useful to relate individual HRM practices to a
specific type of control in the cross-cultural context. In the present study, we use a cybernetic system of control to
characterize global HRM practices and place them in the overall business strategy context of firms.
Numerous attempts have been made to identify the determinants of human resource management [Dyer,
1984; Tichy, Fombrun & Devanna, 1982; Bamberger & Phil1ips, 1992]. The two most frequently cited factors are
the environment and business strategy [Dyer, 1984]. In the cross-cultural context, it has been argued that
international HR strategy is influenced by different competitive strategies such as the product life cycle [Adler &
Ghadar, 1989], organizational life cycle [Mil1iman, Von Glinow & Nathan, 1991], or Mile's & Snow's [1984]
typology of Prospector. Defender and Analyzer strategies [Bird & Beechler, 1995]. However, as proposed by
Bartlett & Ghoshal [1987] and Prahalad & Doz [1987], global competitive strategies need to garner the cost
advantages of global integration of certain tasks vis-a-vis the differentiation benefits of responding to national
differences in tastes, industry structures, distribution systems, and government regulations. In this study, therefore,
we wil1 build an framework to investigate the relationship between these two strategic dimensions (low cost
str~tegy and

local differentiation) and HRM control in a cross-national context.

Additionally, as MNCs can be conceptualized as interorganizational networks [Ghoshal and Bartlett,
1990], subsidiaries ofMNCs operate in the external network also. Typically, they have resource links to
headquarters and other subunits as well as ties to firms and customers in host, home, and other countries. This
interdependence with other organizations creates important implications for HR strategies [Wright & McMahan,
1992; Hannon, Huang & Jaw, 1995]. Baliga and Jaeger [1984] also proposed that the degree of interdependence
between a HQ and its subsidiary was the most crucial factor influencing the extent of delegation and type of HRM
control used by MNCs over their subsidiaries. Thus, we should also investigate the influences of
interorganizational interdependence on individual dimensions of HRM control in a cross-cultural context.
Furthermore, cultural differences have been considered to be an extremely important determinant of

lHRM [Schneider, 1988; Laurent, 1986]. For instance, they have been offered as a contingency variable in the
selection of control systems for subsidiaries [Baliga & Jager, 1984]. Alternatively, competitive strategy is also
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believed to have an influence on HRM [Schuler & Jackson, 1987]. Competitive Strategy has also been thought to
have an interactional influence, along with organizational environment, on HRM [Bamberger & Phillips, 1992].
Furthermore, the institutional structure of the local environment in which a subsidiary is located has also been
considered to play an important role in moderating the influence of economic and technical considerations
[Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990]. Hence, in the present study, we will investigate the moderating effects of these
determinants on the IHRM control over subsidiaries.
In summary, this paper develops a framework to categorize IHR control at the subsidiary level in crosscultural contexts and investigates several potential determil.1ants of IHR from a strategic perspective. First, we
review several theories which were used to build the cybernetic system of HR control in cross-cultural context.
Then, we applied them to a sample of Taiwanese subsidiaries in the PRe. The next section summarizes the
research literature on international and intercultural HR control. Next, the determinants of IHR control are
introduced and discussed. Then, we review the sample and methods used in this study. Our results follow this.
Finally, we discuss the role of these findings for practitioners and researchers.

INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL HR CONTROL
Control can be defined as any process that helps align the actions of individuals with the interests of their
employing firm [Tannenbaum, 1968]. The effectiveness of an organization's control system is a function of the
degree of alignment in the direction of control and the human resource management policies and practices that are
in place to support it [Ouchi, 1979]. The overall control process has been characterized by Ouchi [1981] as
'people treatment' and consists of selection/screening, training, behavior monitoring and output monitoring. In
this vein; two distinct modes of control, bureaucratic and cultural, have emerged from the literature on HR control
[Baligea & Jaeger, 1984; Pucik & Katz, 1986]. More recently, while examining the supervisor/subordinate
relationship, Snell[1992] identified and studied three types of control: (l)input control, (2) behavior control, and
(3) output control.

Here, we extend this reasoning and we propose that these three types of control affect the
Parent/Subsidiary relationship in the context of International HR. Without a doubt, MNCs control their
subsidiaries' (1) HR inputs (by influencing employee selection and training /socialization practices), (2) HR
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behaviors (through the level of bureaucratic and cultural control they do or do not impose), and (3) HR outputs (by
the reward systems they permit or prescribe).
Input Control

Selection
Selection is a basic control and monitoring mechanism, and it is basically a form of input control. Of
course, it occurs prior to the monitoring of output [Jaeger, 1983]. Job applicants are screened and only those who
are most likely to behave as desired within the organization are allowed into the system [Jaeger and Baliga, 1985].
As proposed by Ouchi (1979), selection is used for the internalization and identification of employees. This

practice is most common in the "professional bureaucracies" such as hospitals, public accounting firms, and
universities. Therefore, a control mode designed to identify and select the most appropriate people can generate
high employee commitment as a result of internalized and shared values [Ouchi, 1979]. The selection process must
identify people who: have the technical skills required (or are trainable), will accept the organization's authqrity,
and can learn the organization's rules and regulations - - and perform in accordance with them.
In the MNC context, when most host-country nationals move into the subsidiary's managerial positions,
some major strategic management and control issues arise. They include, how to assure that local managers are
committed to world-wide rather than just local objective [Kobrin, 1988]. One approach is for the parent company
to use the same criteria for selecting HCNs as is used for expatriates. In addition, a corporate culture value
assessment may be used to insure that candidates' personalities match the firm's values [Evans & Lorange, 1986].
In the PRC, most Taiwanese companies seem to be inclined to select new employees based on the
recommendations of international employees. Indeed, about half of them promote local, highly-educated
employees to be subsidiary managers [Huang, 1995; Kao, Lin Hsu & Lin, 1995]. Alternatively, it is still difficult
to staff all new managers and financial experts using HCNs, especially chief executive officers (CEOs). Therefore,
most Taiwanese companies import CEOs and top executives from their parent companies.

. Training and Socialization
In cybernetic systems, selection and training are considered to be input control activities [Snell, 1992].
Ouchi [1979] proposed that most organizations can rely on selection and screening only to a limited extent.
Thereafter, they may rely on training to impart the desired skills and values. Indeed, training provides
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organization members with the necessary abilities and values to be successful in the organization. The component
of training which ultimately has the greatest impact on control is values training or socialization [Etzioni, 1961].
This is an interpersonal process of informally or implicitly teaching organizational values and behavioral
expectations to organizational members to bring them into line with what is required for successful participation
within the organization [Jaeger and Baliga, 1985].
Therefore, MNCs that rely heavily on cultural control tend to emphasize a longitudinal process of
socialization as the primary vehicle for managerial training. Its purpose is to ensure that future managers
thoroughly internalize the corporate culture and related information-processing rules and norms before assuming
managerial responsibilities in a subsidiary [Pucik and Katz, 1986]. In addition many MNCs recognized that
management development programs need to emphasize worldwide information sharing on economic, social,
political, technological and market trends. Some companies export home country training and development
programs to other countries for local employees. In addition, they may bring host-country nationals to corporate
headquarters in order to expose them to the corporate culture and help them develop a corporate perspective
[Dowling and Schuler, 1990].
As indicated by Von Glinow & Teagarden [1988], the Chinese currently believe that training is the

primary vehicle for creating productivity. Additionally, acquiring expertise through training accords a certain
amount of power to the person who has been trained. A likely outcome of trainingis that the individual will be
placed into a managerial position elsewhere, and they will be called upon to apply the training to their job.
However, for the most part, the training is primarily technical training, and behavioral training is virtually
nonexistent and exceedingly difficult to implement. By now, to minimize expatriation costs, most big Taiwanese
companies have begun to devote even more resources to train their local managers in their PRC subsidiaries [Kao
et aI., 1995].

Behavior Control
In the MNC/Subsidiary context, bureaucratic control is manifested when headquarters manages the
operations of subsidiaries primarily through a clearly defined set of rules and procedures. These rules may be
enforced through budgets, on-site inspections, and/or control of management processes [Doz and Prahalad, 1984].
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Bureaucratic control systems operate under principles of rationality and are characterized by a high degree
of formalization. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are the central elements of a bureaucratic control system.
SOPs constitute behavioral repertoires which are expected of members in the organization and are written down in
the form of company manuals or rule books [Hickson, 1966]. Child [1973] notes that bureaucratic control consists
of the utilization of a limited and explicit set of codified rules and regulations which delineate desired performance
in terms of outputs and lor behaviors. Based on assumption of a centralized hierarchy, behavior control is initiated
at the top of the organization in the form of articulated operating procedures [Cheng and McKinley, 1984; Hitt,
Hoskisson, and Ireland, \990]. Snell [1992] defined bureaucratic behavior control to come in the form of
centralization, articulated procedures, close supervision, and behavior appraisal.
In MNCs, bureaucratic control exists when headquarters controls the operations of a subsidiary primarily
through a clearly defined set of rules and procedures. Doz [1986] notes that there are thirteen elements of
subsidiary performance analyzed monthly by IBM corporate staff, and even more detailed analyses of results are
conducted within each of these broad categories. In fact, centralization, formalization and standardization (such as
written policies, rules, job descriptions, and standard procedures--through manuals and charts) are coordination
mechanisms used by MNCs for integrating activities that remain dispersed across subsidiaries [Martinez and
Jarillo, 1991].
In PRC, the Marxist - Leninist doctrine has historically influenced performance, and except for meeting
output quotas, workers have traditionally not been under pressure to perform [Von Glinow & Teagarden, 1988].
Given this, Kao et al. [1995] argued that tight and explicit monitoring will be useful for managing Chinese
workers in the PRC subsidiaries of Taiwan companies.
Output Control

The process of output control is basically a process of monitoring an indicator, comparing it with a
standard, and then providing selective rewards and adjustment [Ouch, 1977]. In the case of output control, the
transformation process need not be known, much less monitored, but a reliable and valid measure of the desired
outputs must be available [Quchi, 1977; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987]. In addition, in order to induce performance that·
fulfills an organization's intention, rewards systems need to be linked to results [Kerr, 1985; Snell, 1992].
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In MNCs, it seems particularly important to match the corporation's strategic pursuits with the goals,
competencies, and motivations of key mangers. [Edstrom and Lorange, 1984]. In fact, reward systems in most
MNCs are based on a linkage between performance and financial incentives. Since the decoupling of appraisals
and rewards may render control initiatives ineffective. [Pucik and Katz, 1988]. Furthermore, Pucik [1984] posits
that reward systems must take into account equity issues within the organization and in the external labor market
in these countries where managers are recruited. Therefore, output control in MNCs is based on the use of resultsdriven appraisals, performance - reward links, and localized monetary incentives.
In the PRC, financial incentives are beginning to influence work behavior [Von Glinow & Teagarden,
1988]. However, some argue that using bonus systems to promote greater work effort will fail because of the small
magnitude of bonuses and preferences for the egalitarian distribution of bonuses [Jackson, 1992]. Nevertheless, as
described by Huang [1995], floating variable wages almost explain 20% of base wages of Chinese workers in PRC
subsidiaries of Taiwan companies.

THE DETERMINANTS OF IHR CONTROL
Interorganizational Interdependence
The influence of interorganizational interdependence on HRM has been advanced by two perspectives:
resource dependence [Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984; Pfeffer & Langton, 1988] and institutionalism [Scott, 1987]. In the
MNC context, various studies have noted a relationship between the dependence of the subsidiary on the
multinational parent for resources and the influence of that parent over the subsidiary's HRM [Baliga and Jaeger,
1984; Martinez and Ricks, 1989]. However, as indicated by Prahalad and Doz [1981], after subsidiaries mature
and grow, they may have adequate technology, management capability, and marketing capabilities such that the
HQ cannot continue to rely on control over these resource as a means of influencing subsidiary strategy. When this
is the case, the subsidiary's dependence on local resources may become more profound. Additionally, institutional
theorists have argued that the relational networks in the environment play an important role in influencing the
behavior of organizations [Meyer & Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1988]. When a subsidiary is embedded in an external
network (consisting of the parent organization, such as partners, suppliers, regulators, and competitors), its HRM
will be influenced by these host institutions [Wright and McMahan, 1992]. Therefore, it is imperative to
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investigate the effects of the subsidiary's interdependencies with parent and local institutions on choice of its HRM
controls.
Parent Resource Interdependence
According to a study by Kao et al [1995], 52.3% of raw material for PRC subsidiaries and 73.4% of all
production equipment for PRC subsidiaries comes from their Taiwanese parent companies. In addition, 80% of
Taiwan parent companies executed new product designs and innovations and market. All to say, PRC subsidiaries
have high degree of interdependence with their Taiwan parents.
In fact, MNCs relied on control over resources. such as capital, technology, and management as a means
of influencing subsidiary strategy. According to the resource dependence model [Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978], if a
subsidiary depends on a flow of valuable resources (e.g. money, technology, information, skills) from intercountry
organizations (e.g. HQ, and subunits of MNCs), its human resource practices will be influenced by them greatly
[Pfeffer & Cohen. 1984; Pfeffer & Langton, 1988]. As indicated by Martinez and Ricks' empirical study [1989],
the influence of a multinational parent over the HRM decisions of an subsidiary is positively related to the extent to
which a multinational parent provides resources to that subsidiary. In this situation, the hierarchical power of HQ
is more effective at counteracting the power of the subsidiary, and it is potentially easier to have direct control over
such a relationship through this mechanism. Similarly, as proposed by Prahalad and Doz [1981], in a pure
hierarchical organization, the support system (such as personnel) tends to be aligned with the hierarchy.
Martinez & Ricks [1989] found that U.S. parent companies tended to be more involved in the selection
process of managers for subsidiaries with high resource dependence on the parent company. Alternatively,
subsidiaries with low resource dependence would simply submit a selection decision to the U.S. parent for approval
after the decision had been made by the I subsidiary's general. manager. Therefore. the subsidiary's dependence on
parent's resources influences the level of input control exercised by the parent.
Additionally, when a subsidiary has high level of dependence on its parent's technology or management
srstem, it is expected that formal training programs or inpatriate visits will be necessary for the subsidiary's
managers or related personnel to become proficient [Pucik & Katz, 1986]. Thus, subsidiary's dependencies on
parent's resources are usually positively related to the level of training & socialization offered.
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Furthermore, as indicated by Martinez & Jarillo [1991], a subsidiary's' dependence on parent's technology
or tight integration in the purchasing function will lead to high levels of global integration in the business strategy.
Therefore, more formalization, standardization and centralization will be used as global coordination mechanisms.
Edstrom and Lorange [1984] also indicated that in a global business, conglomerates are characterized by
operational interdependencies evident in product sourcing and standardization of marketing. Hence, a manager's
freedom to act will typically be more restricted. Pucik & Katz [1986] proposed that the explicitness of rules and
bureaucratic control systems are related to how much technology and information is transferred to the subsidiary.
Consequently, subsidiary's dependence on parent's resources will be positively related to IHRM control.
Hypothesis Ja: Interdependence with parent's resources is positively related to IHR input control.
Hypothesis Jb: Interdependence on parent's resources is positively related to IHR behavior control.

Locollnstitution Interdependence
Since 1992, the PRC has gradually opened its local markets to MNCs. Since then, most big Taiwanese
companies began to cultivate their relationships with local suppliers, distribution channels, and host governments
in order to penetrate the market in China [Kao et al., 1995]. As the subsidiary matures and becomes bigger, it can
expand its base of technical, manufacturing, financial, and management resources. Likewise, if a subsidiary
interacts with customers, suppliers, regulators, and competitors within this country, or if it is partly owned by local
firms, it will have a high level of local institution dependence. When this is the case, its success may depend more
on how well it fits in its local environment than on how much support it needs from HQ [Doz & Prahalad, 1986].
Additionally, according to institutionalism [Scott, 1987], the HRM practices of a subsidiary will also be
influenced by host governments enacting certain laws (such as Equal Employment Opportunity regulations and
Minimum Wage statutes). Similarly, practices may be influenced by other organizations (such as local
competitors) [Wright & McMahan, 1992]. In other words, host institutions dependencies will influence
subsidiaries' HR practices. For instance, these pressures may necessitate that performance appraisals be directly
linked to reward structures. Indeed, Hambrick & Snow [1989] propose that if the managers are considered to be
independent contnbutors, their rewards should be directly linked to the performance of their units. Consequently,
Hypothesis 2: Dependence on local institutions is positively related to IHR output control.
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Competitive Strategy

Schuler & Jackson [1987] are among a growing number of researchers who have made a link between HRM
practices and competitive strategies. To do so, they adapted Porter's [1985] competitive strategies by focusing on
innovative, quality enhancing, and cost reducing HR strategies. Their research revealed that two factors, low cost
competition and local differentiation, are particularly important to a company's HRM control. In addition, as
proposed by Bartlett & Ghoshal [1987] and Prahalad & Doz [1987], global competitive strategies need to capture
the cost advantages of global integration of certain activities vis-a-vis the benefits that could be derived from
responding to national differences in tastes, industry structures, distribution systems and government regulations.
Therefore,

we tum to the relationship between these two strategic imperative and human resource control in the

cross-cultural or cross-national context.
Low Cost Competition
When a l'v1NC enters into the mature phase of the product life cycle, cost competition will become the major
business strategy of its subsidiaries. In such a state, the focus is on productivity and cost effectiveness [Alder &
Ghadar, 1989]. Usually, this is a globally integrated firm which develops an integrated approach and enforces
similarity to pursue economies of scale [Adler & Ghadr, 1989]. In this situation, the parent company will
emphasize selecting subsidiary managers who understand and appreciate global strategies (Edstrom & Lorange,
1984]. Additionally, if a company has an efficiency orientation, it will stress the long-term development of
employee abilities, skills and knowledge [Bird & BeecWer, 1995]. In addition, to reduce costs, MNCs will reduce
their expatriate populations and stress training on local managers [Kobrin, 1988].Therefore, cost competition will
lead to more IHR input control.
Furthermore, Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Cardy [1995] proposed that explicit job descriptions and the use of
performance appraisal as a control both fit Porter's overall cost leadership strategies. In addition, Bird and BeecWer
[1995] also propose robust relationships between an efficiency orientation and centralized control systems and
standardized operating procedures. Therefore, it appears that a low cost strategy will lead to more IHR control.

Hypothesis 3a: Cost competition is positively related to IHR input control.
Hypothesis 3b: Cost competition is positively related to IHR behavioral control.
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Local Differentiation
If the needs of host country's market differ considerably from those others in which the MNC operates, the

resident subsidiary must differentiate its products to respond to local customers [Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987].
Sometimes, MNCs use a cultural diversity dimension to differentiate products and services when culturally distinct
markets must be served. In addition, they may tap cultural diversity differences.. as a source of new ideas when
innovation is needed [Alder and Ghadar, 1989]. In this situation, the company should use perquisites and benefits
to attract high skilled labor, scientists, and creative people while using performance appraisals as developmental
tools [Gomez-Mejia et al., 1995]. Furthermore, as proposed by Edstrom & Lorange [1984] , in this situation the
parent needs to stress that the national manager's reward will be linked to financial and market performance
measures. Consequently,
Hypothesis 4: Local differentiation is positively related to /HR output control.

Cultural Difference

Cultural difference refers to the extent that a subsidiary's national culture differs from its corporate culture
[Boyacigiller, 1990]. Key dimensions of culture include such characteristics as: individualism versus collectivism,
large or small power distance, strong or weak universality avoidance, and masculinity versus femininity [Hofstede,
1983]. Laurent's [1986] research demonstrates that there is variance across continents (the U. S. vs. Europe), and
countries (within Europe) along these dimensions. Naturally, the HR policies developed at headquarters usually
reflect the national cultural of the MNC [Schneider, 1988]. According to Schuler & Jackson [1987], MNCs can
choose from a menu ofHR practices, but there remains a need to keep the MNC's and the subsidiary's strategies
and cultures somewhat aligned by taking into account the differences in national cultures where the subsidiaries
are operating. Based on the existing literature [Von Glinow & Teagarden, 1988; Jackson, 1992; Huang, 1995; Kao
et al, 1995], the cultural differences in organizations in the PRC and Taiwan can be categorized as follows, Taiwan
(a) emphasis on cooperation and teamwork, (b) organization takes care of employees' interests, (c) emphasis on
decentralization,

~d)

employees help each other, (e) organization actively manages problems; PRC: (a) emphasis on

individual needs, (b) employees look out for their own interests, (c) emphasis on centralization, (d) subordinates
depend on their leader, (e) organization passively addresses problems.
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Generally speaking, high cultural differences will put a subsidiary in danger of being overpowered by
local cultural and economic forces. When this threat exists, MNCs are more apt to use tight control over the
subsidiaries [Cray, 1984]. Thus, cultural differences will be positively related to lHR behavior control.
Hypothesis 5a Cultural differences Is positively related to IHR behavior control.
Hypothesis 5b: . The interaction ofcultural difference and interdependence with parent
resource is positively related to IHR behavior control.
Hypothesis 5c: The interaction ofcultural difference and low cost strategy is negatively
related to IHR input control.

For instance, consider the case of subsidiary with a high cultural difference and a high interdependence on
its parent. The parent wilI need to send expatriates to transfer technology and management to the subsidiary.
However, the local employees might be reluctant to accept the parent's culture given the large culture difference.
In this case, the subsidiaries tend to be easily influenced by local cultural or economic forces. Alternatively, when
there are low cultural differences, the expatriates who are sent to transfer the parent's technology and management
systems wilI find it easy to transfer their technology and management to local employees. Thus, behavior control
over the subsidiary will be low. As suggested by Baliga & Jaeger [1984], in the case of a subsidiary with a high
sequential interdependence (receiving resources from other parts of the MNC) and high cultural proximity, the
parent should not adopt behavior control over the subsidiary. Consequently, the interaction of interdependence
with parent and cultural difference is positively related to the behavior control over subsidiaries.
Next, consider the case of a subsidiary with low cost strategy and high cultural differences. Cultural
differences raise costs and complicate of socialization [Baliga & Jaeger, 1984]. Thus, the parent will probably not
rely on selection control over the subsidiary's HR inputs for the reason of low cost consideration. Alternatively, in
the case of low cultural differences, training & socialization which can impart the parent's values and technology
to the subsidiary will become an important alternative to control the subsidiary's HR inputs [Wilkins & Ouchi,
1983]. This is even more likely to be true when the subsidiary is not able to afford a better base of technical and
managerial

cap~ilities

to pursue a low cost strategy. Consequently, the interaction of low cost strategy and

cultural difference is negatively related to the use of IHR input control over subsidiary.
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MEASURES AND METHODS
Sample
Three hundred fifty six Taiwanese subsidiaries in the PRC were surveyed during June to September of
1995. The companies that were selected comprise half the 712 Taiwanese subsidiaries which were all listed in the
register compiled by the Association of Taiwanese companies in PRC. Questionnaires were sent to and completed
by the CEO or HR executive of the parent company. One hundred respondents returned questionnaires, for a
response rate of 28%. Summary statistics (see Table I) suggest that these firms present a reasonably
representative sample of the Taiwanese subsidiaries operating in the PRC. In instances, the percentage of
ownership by the parent company was at least 50%. Seventy three subsidiaries are the in manufacturing industry
and twenty seven are service related.
Measures

IHR Control
The HR control items were designed to measure the degree of selection control, training control, behavior
control, and output control used by the parents. They are outlined below:

1. INPUT: Selection control: parent's approval of subsidiaries' managers above second-level, parent's
agreement with staffing of subsidiaries' managers, and parent's procedures for staffing subsidiaries'
mangers.
2. INPUT: Training and Socialization control: managers and technicians frequently visit the foreign
group, parents commitment to training managers, parents involved in managers' skill development,
substantial foreign training for subsidiaries' managers before assignment.
3. THROUGHPUT: behavior control: explicit monitoring, frequent feedback, and centralization of
appraisal.
4. OUTPUT: Rewards control: results criteria, performance-reward link, localized monetary incentives.

The measures of control were based upon research by Snell [1992]. They were modified somewhat for this
MNC, as opposed to a solely domestic context. The scale for control consisted of 24 indicators on a 7-point Likert
scale.

lnterorganizationallnterdependence
Two measures of interorganizational interdependence were used: interdependence with parent and
dependence on local institutions. First, parent resource interdependence was measured with a 5-item, 7-point
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Likert Scale adapted from the work of Martinez and Ricks [1989] and Prahalad and Doz [1981]. It consisted of
questions addressing: the degree to which parent's technology is used, management know-how, the degree of
integration of subsidiary's purchasing with the rest of the corporation, the ratio of the subsidiary's exports to total
sales, and the ratio of the subsidiary's sales to its parent's total sales.
Local institution interdependence was measured with a 7-item, 7-point Likert scale adapted from Ghoshal
and Bartlett [1990]. It included: reliance on local technological expertise, reliance on local managerial expertise,
strength of relationships with local suppliers, reliance on the host government, reliance on host country distribution
channels, and reliance on management know-how provided by local competitors and partners.

Competitive Strategy
Two dimensions of competitive strategy were analyzed to assess the competitive advantages of the
subsidiary: low cost competition and local differentiation cost. The first, low cost competition was measured with
a 4-item Likert Scale adapted from Schuler and Jackson [1989]. It measured the importance ascribed to:
maximizing operating efficiency, maintaining high product quality, stable procurement of raw materials, and
improving operating processes.
Local differentiation was measured with a 4 item, 7-point Likert Scale adapted from Schuler and Jackson
[1989] and Kim and Mauborgne [1992]. It tapped the degree to which the subsidiary: modifies product offerings
to meet local customer needs, adapts promotion schemes to the local markets, innovates new product (or service) to
address local demands, and adapts its distribution approach to the local market.

Cultural Difference
To assess the cultural differences between host country and parent company a 5-item, 7-point scale
adapted from the cultural dimensions of Hofstede [1983] was used. (shown in Table 2). The respondents were
asked the following questions about each item of the five items: What is the level in the parent company? What is
the level in the local environment? The two responses were then compared and the difference between the two was
defined as a cultural difference.
Methodology
The first step in this analysis was to identify the dimensions ofIHR control, competitive strategy, and
interorganizational interdependence. Since it can be used for construct validation, detecting tentative dimensions,
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and identifYing items for deletion [Schwab, 1980], factor analysis was used in this step. It was used to group
together and then reduce the number of items for each of these constructs so that the underlying dimensions could
be identified. The specific method applied was factor analysis of principle components with varimax rotation.

This enabled us to assess the convergence within and divergence between the scales.
The second step consisted of examining the relationships between the different dimensions of IHR control
that emerged and each of their contextual determinants. This facilitates the testing of the hypotheses formulated
previously. One set of hypotheses (1,2,3,4, and 5a) address the main effects that the interdependency, strategy,
and cultural difference variables have on IHR control. Another set (5b and 5c) focuses on the effects of several
interactions on IHR control. Thus, a hierarchical model in which these variables and the interaction terms were
entered according to their predicted causal sequence [Stone and Hollenbeck., 1984; Baron and Kenny, 1986] was
used. The effects of our hypothesized predictors were assessed on the basis of their individual unstandardized
regression coefficients [Duncan, 1975; Aiken and West, 1991] and their contribution to the total variance in IHR
control, evaluated as a change in R2 • The interaction terms were entered into the equation after all the related
study variables had been controlled for [Cohen & Cohen, 1983].
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RESULTS
Intercorrelations
Table 2 give means, standard deviations, and coefficient alphas, for the variables. The alphas indicate
internal consistency [James, Demaree, and Wolf, 1984]. As can be seen, the alphas for all the IHR control
variables, cultural differences and competitive strategy measures were higher than. 70. This is a level which is
satisfactory for basic research; for the proportion of error variance for a scale with an alpha of .80 is precisely the
same for any test regardless of the number of items [Cortina, 1993]. Note that all of the alphas also meet
Nunnally's [1967] criterion of .50 for adequate reliability.
Factor Analyses

IHR Control
The first factor analysis of IHR control produced three stable factors representing input, behavior, output
control. Each had an eigenvalue above 1.0, and in sum they accounted for 82 percent of variance in the data.
Table 3 gives items and factors loadings.

InterorganizationalInterdependence
The second factor analysis for interorganizational interdependence produced two stable factors
representing subsidiaries' dependence on local institutions and interdependence with parent. Each had an
eigenvalue above 1.0, and together they accounted for 41 percent of variance in the data. Table 4 gives these items
and their factor loadings.

Competitive Strategy
The third factor analysis of competitive strategy produced two stable factors representing local
differentiation and low cost competition. Each had an eigen value above 1.0, and in total they accounted for 70
percent of variance in data. Table 5 gives the items and factors loadings.
Moderated Multiple Regression Analyses

Predicting IHR Input Control
In the first hierarchical model (Table 6), we test the hypotheses addressing the main and moderated effects
of the contextual determinants on IHR input control. In Equation 1, we begin by regressing input control on
interorganization interdependence. In Equation 2, cultural difference and the interaction terms generated by
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cultural difference and interorganization interdependence are introduced. These equations make it possible to
examine the main effects of interorganizational interdependence and cultural differences on input control, and
their interactions. In Equation 3, the competitive strategy variables are introduced to examine their main effects on
input control. Next, cultural difference and the interaction terms generated by competitive strategies and cultural
difference are included in Equation 4. Finally, the complete model incorporating interorganizational
interdependencies, competitive strategies, cultural differences and their interactions is represented in Equation 5.
With respect to the predictors of IHR input control, in Table 6, we found that the main effect of a low cost
competition strategy .94 is present (b=O.3, p<.05). In addition, the interaction effect generated by cultural
difference and the low cost competition strategy is significant negative (b=-O.04, p<.05). These findings suggest
that low cost competition is positively related to the selection control over subsidiary. MNCs need to select and
train subsidiary's managers who understand and appreciate the global strategy for pursuing economies of scale in
an integrated and global organization [Edstrom & Lorange, 1984]. However, when cultural difference is high, the
positive effect of low cost competition on input control will be reduced, because decentralizing responsibility is a
means of minimizing payroll costs to foster for executing low cost competition. Moreover, cultural differences
generate higher costs for training & socialization.
It is worthy to note that an initial finding of a main effect of dependence on local institution
interdependence on input control (b=O.20, p<.05) seems to contradict the findings of Martinez & Ricks [1989] and
the argument of Prahalad & Doz [1981]. They argue that dependence on local resources causes the subsidiary to
be more independent, and, thus, the parent will not be able to influence selection decisions. This observation can
be countered as follows: many Taiwanese companies entered into the PRC only within the last six years (see Table
1). Also, due to the restrictions of the PRC's government, many Taiwanese companies have adopted joint venture
arrangements with local partners. In addition, as a result of the political tensions between the PRC and Taiwan,
Taiwanese companies are more dependent on local institutions. In this situation, dependence on local institutions
is not exactly the same as a situation where a subsidiary becomes more independent after a long history, as alluded

-

to by Prahalad & Doz [1981]. In this situation, HR input control can import the parent's management of the
subsidiary and become an important control. mechanism at the beginning of the foreign investment, lest the
subsidiary should be swayed by local forces and deviate from the parent's goal [Cray, 1984].
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Predicting IHR Behal'ior Control
In the second hierarchical model (see Table 7), we test the hypotheses concerning the main and moderated
effects of these contextual determinants on IHR behavior control. In Equation I, we begin by regressing behavior
control on interorganizational interdependencies. In Equation 2, cultural difference is introduced and the
interaction terms generated by the interdependence variables and cultural difference are added. These equations
make it possible to explore the main and interaction effects of interorganizational interdependencies and cultural
differences on bureaucratic behavior control (Hypotheses Ib and 5a). In Equation 3, we isolate the effects of the
competitive strategy variables. In Equation 4, cultural difference and the two interaction terms generated by
competitive strategies and cultural differences are included. These equations enable us to test the main and
interaction effects of competitive strategies on behavior control. In Equation 5, the main and interaction effects for
interorganizational interdependencies, competitive strategies, and cultural differences are represented.
Concerning the determinants of behavior control, we find that initially there are significant positive
relationships between the behavior control and parent resource interdependence (b=O.35 , p<.05) in Equation I and
a positive interaction effect between cultural difference and parent resource interdependence (b=O.05, p<.05) in
Equation 2. In Equation 4, a positive effect for low cost strategy (b=O.79, p<.OI) is observed. These results
suggest that when a subsidiary is highly dependent on parent's resources, the MNC usually will exert behavior
control over the subsidiary. As proposed Martinez & Richks [1989], if a MNC has a greater strategic control over
the resources in its subsidiary, its hierarchical power will facilitate a tighter control over the subsidiary's
performance. When a subsidiary is seen to be in danger of being influenced by local cultural forces, a MNC is more
apt to introduce formalized mechanisms to gain control. Furthermore, Equations 3 and 5 confirm that a low cost
strategy is also associated with increased behavioral control (b=1.52, p<.05).
Predicting IHR Output Control
In the third hierarchical model (see Table 8), we test the hypotheses relating to the determinants of IHR
output control. In Equation I, we begin by regressing output control on the interorganizational interdependence
variables. In Equation 2, we bring in cultural differences and several interaction terms. In Equation 3, we
introduce the competitive strategy variables. Equation 4 includes the competitive strategy and cultural difference
interaction terms as well. In Equation 5, the complete set of main and interaction effects are modeled.
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As for the determinants of output control over subsidiaries, these results reveal that local institution

interdependence, parent resource interdependence, and local differentiation strategy are invariant with IHR output
control. Thus, Hypothesis 2 and 4 are not supported. They propose that when a subsidiary is highly dependent on
local resources or adopts a local differentiation strategy, it will increase its output control over the subsidiary by
linking rewards to performance.
As indicated by Von Glinow & Teagarden [1988], due to the cultural and ideological factors, financial

incentives are quite new and they are only beginning to be used to influence Chinese work behavior. Generally,
when a unit within an enterprise performs meritoriously and a cash incentive is distributed, that incentive is
distributed equally among all individuals, no matter where the work group, department, or division is in the
hierarchy. Jackson [1992] also indicated that the failure of the Chinese bonus system to promote greater work
effort in the workplace can be explained from two perspectives: (a) the magnitude of the bonuses and (b) the
egalitarian distribution of bonuses. Therefore, at present, financial incentives do not seem to work well in the
PRC. These conditions may contribute to the non-significant relationships between dependence constructs and
output control.
Additionally, in the PRC, rapid change and innovation are almost universally resented and resisted [Von
Glinow & Teagarden, 1988]. Thus, the motivation of financial incentives to encourage innovative worker behavior
may not be effective. Furthermore, most Taiwanese companies in the PRC execute a local differentiation strategy
usually by modifying their existing products from Taiwan, because of the developing stage of the PRC economy
[ Kao et al., 1995]. This situation may also contribute to the non-significant relationship between local
differentiation and output control. Alternatively, in Equations 3, 4, and 5 in Table 10, we found a positive
relationship between low cost strategy and output control. Therefore, output control may be mostly useful for
encouraging Chinese workers to promote their operational efficiency.
In summary, the conclusions that may be derived from this study are that a low cost strategy has a strong,
positive effect on IHR input control. This effect is even stronger when the cultural difference between the parent

-

and subsidiary is low. In addition, a low cost strategy also has a significant, positive effect on IHR behavior control
and IHR output control. Furthermore, cultural difference has a significant, positive effect on IHR output control.
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As proposed by Ghoshal and Bartlett [1990], MNCs are interorganizational networks. They are

embedded in external networks made up of other organizations including: owners, regulators, customers, suppliers,
and other entities. The MNC's headquarters as well as its subsidiaries must interact with these groups. In any
interorganizational network, a subsidiary's HR is liable to be influenced by these interorganizational
interdependencies, which include: parent resource interdependence and local institution interdependence. Indeed,
Baliga and Jaeger [1984] have proposed that these interdependencies are the most crucial factors influencing the
HR policies and practices of any subsidiary. However, these relationships are thought to be moderated by cultural
proximity.
As for the relationship between IHR and business strategy [Bird & Beechler, 1995], it is important to

consider the influence of the subsidiary's host culture and the parent's organizational culture [Schneider, 1988].
Excellent MNCs work to align their organizational culture, overall strategy, and human resource management
practices [Adler & Ghadar, 1989]. In this study, the IHR control mechanisms of Taiwanese subsidiaries in the
PRC are observed to be affected by interorganizational interdependencies, competitive strategies, and cultural
differences.

Future Research
Although the field of strategic control of IHR has advanced over the last decade, most of the development
has been conceptual, often focusing on the effects of cultural factors or product life cycles on different competitive
strategies and interorganizational interdependencies. As revealed in this study, these factors exert both main and
interaction effects on IHR control. Therefore, the findings from this study should be useful to international human
resource managers and researchers interested in strategic international human resource management.
The current study has several limitations which need to be discussed and improved upon in future
research. First, as noted, the respondents in this study were CEOs and HR executives in Taiwan. Officers or HR
executives in the subsidiaries in the PRC were not surveyed. Future research might incorporate inputs from the
subsidiary-level counterparts of the parent company executives we surveyed. Also, future research might try to
refine the constructs and operationalizations of interorganizational interdependence, competitive strategy, and
cultural differentiation. For example, in this study, items regarding subsidiaries' expatriates, an important factor
related to a subsidiary's dependence on its parent's resource were not included. Martinez and Ricks [1989] point
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out that expatriate managers have a substantial influence on affiliates' HRM decisions. Therefore, future studies
that include inputs from this group may be even more informative.
Third, future research might try to refine the constructs and operational definition of human resource
control. For instance, in this study, items related to local acculturation of subsidiaries' expatriates - an important
element of a subsidiary's HRM -_were.not included. In addition, as is shown in Table 1, all ofthe Taiwanese
subsidiaries have been in the PRC for less than six years. This time limitation is likely to have affected
dependence on local institutions. Hence, the subsidiary independence status proposed by Prahalad & Doz [1981]
may not yet be possible.
Finally, the construct domain for output control remains somewhat unclear. Further research might
investigate whether explicit performance reporting systems are best conceived as a form of output control, as Jaeger
and Baliga (1985) suggest, or whether they are associated with behavior control (Snell 1992). As stated by Snell
(1992), researchers have developed many different frameworks to describe both of these types of control. This
study stresses the control over process to be a form of behavior control, thus the subsidiary's frequent reports to
headquarters are construed to be a method for MNCs to control the subsidiary's HR. processes. Obviously, further
research is need to refine this construct.
Despite these limitations, the results from this study provide us with a better understanding of the
relationships between subsidiaries' IHR. strategies and the IHR. controls used to implement them within
multinational corporations.
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Table 1
Subsidiary Sample Profiie

. .

Characteristic

Categories

Firms (n=100)

Location of Subsidiaries

Kwangtung
Fugen
Jiang Su & Shanghai
Beeipimg & Tianjin
Others

24
9
47
10
10

Parent's Ownership

50%-70%
70%-90%
90%-100%

34
14
52

Employees

under 100
100 - 500
500 - 1000
> 1000

42
46
6
6

Subsidiaries' tenure

o-

2 yrs.
2 - 4 yrs.
4 - 6 yrs.
> 6 yrs.

37
39
10
14

Industry Type

Manufacturing
Service

73
27
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Subsidiary Sample

4

Mean

S.D.

a

1

2

1. Input
2. Behavior
3. Output

38.97
53.35
32.06

6.43
8.82
5.59

.84
.85
.84

.48
.17

.25

Competitive Strategy
4. Local Differentiation (LD)
5. Low Cost Competition (LC)

18.94
23.87

7.20
3.64

.93
.71

.06
.21

.11
.34

-.10
.28

.23

Interorganizational Interdependence
6. Local Institution (LI)
7. Parent Resource (PR)

32.40
24.57

6.84
5.45

.73
.58

.21
.40

.06
.22

-.02
.16

Culture
8. Cultural Difference (CD)

16.87

7.31

.82

.18

.25

.10

Variables

3

5

6

.45
-.18

.10
.25

.00

.14

-.11

-.17

7

IHR Control

.74

8
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Table 3
Factor Analysis of IHR Control

Questionnaire Items

Factor Loadings

1

2'

3

1. IHR Behavior Control
Consulting with H.Q. in setting appraisal systems
Parent concern with procedure and methods
Consulting with H.Q. in setting standards
Receiving frequent performance feedback from H.Q.
Parent concern with work process
Receiving performance feedback daily from H.Q.
Account for detail actions to H.Q.
Subsidiary's appraisal place primary on work behavior
Report frequent performance information to H.Q.
Performance programs are imposed by H.Q.

0.68
0.75
0.75
0.70
0.48
0.36
0.52
0.57
0.69
0.62

-0.03
-0.01
-0.20
-0.02
0.06
0.32
0.16
-0.04
0.10
0.21

-0.27
-0.07
-0.02
-0.06
0.05
0.26
0.18
0.11
0.05
0.05

2. IHR Input Control
Series of parent's evaluations for second level managers
before staffing
Parent's agreement with staffing of second level managers
Involvement in on the job training for managers
Parent's commitment to training the managers
Parent provide staffing procedures for managers
Substantial training for managers
Staffing managers with same work value

-0.05
0.07
-0.15
0.10
0.16
-0.06
0.28

0.89
0.77
0.84
0.73
0.63
0.68
0.36

-0.01
-0.10
0.04
0.03
-0.03
0.20
0.05

3. IHR Output Control
Performance appraisal is based on reaching goals
The incentives are linked to subsidiary's profit
Performance is judged by results
Manager's rewards are linked to concrete results
Differences in managers' pay represent performance
Target are written
Managers receive higher pay in the same industry

-0.06
0.06
-0.14
0.07
-0.06
0.23
-0.08

-0.08
-0.19
-0.01
0.06
0.07
0.12
0.15

0.76
0.78
0.75
0.82
0.80
0.52
0.23

Eigenvalue
Percentage of Variance Explained
Total Variance Explained

3.61
0.45
0.45

1.99
0.25
0.70

1.00
0.12
0.84
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Table 4
..
Factor Analysis of Interorganizational Interdependence

Questionnaire items

Factor Loadings
1
2

1. Local Institution Interdependence (LI)

0.66
0.70
0.67
0.60
0.57
0.61
0.50

0.23
0.10
-0.17
0.28
-0.05
-0.38
-0.01

2. Parent Resource Interdependence (PR)
Ratio: Subsidiary exports to subsidiary sales
Technology importing from parent
Management systems imported from parent
Integration of purchasing with the sister subsidiaries
Ratio: Subsidiary sales to MNC sales

0.15
-0.12
-0.04
0.17
-0.24

0.74
0.69
0.45
0.48
0.51

Eigenvalue
Percentage of Variance Explained
Total Variance Explained

2.82
0.24
0.24

2.03
0.17
0.41

Dependence on technicians supply
Emphasis of management reference to local competitors
Emphasis of management reference to local partners
Dependence on managers supply
Emphasis of relationship with local suppliers
Emphasis of relationship with local distributors
Emphasis of relationship with host government
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Table 5
Factor Analysis of Competitive Strategies

Questionnaire items

Factor Loadings
1
2

1. Local Differentiation (LD)

0.86
0.95
0.93
0.89

0.11
-0.09
-0.05
0.07

2. Low Cost Competition (LC)
Maintaining high product quality control
Improving manufacturing processes
Having stable procurement of raw materials
Maximizing operating efficiency

-0.21
0.13
0.14
-0.00

0.86
0.77
0.81
0.45

Eigenvalue
Percentage of Variance Explained
Total Variance Explained

3.61
0.45
0.45

1.99
0.25
0.70

Modifying product for local use
Using localized marketing
Controlling local distribution channels
Innovating products for local use

-/
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Table 6
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for IHR Input Control

Equation 2
b.
s.e.

Equation 3
b.
s.e

Equation 4
b.
s.e.

Equation 5
b.
s.e.

------------------

----------------

-----------------

----------------

20.71

29.87*** 4.30

1.31

-4.05

12.44

.10
.35

.21
.31

.26
.23
1.25** .46

.32
.94*

.26
.46

.51

1.10

.68

.01
.02

.00
.01
-.02
-.04*

.01
.02
.01
.02

Variables

Equation 1
s.e.
b.

Intercept

20.85*** 3.88

.20*
.09
.47*** .11

.24
.31

Interorganizational
Interdependence
Local Institution (LI)
Parent Resource (PR)

-_ ............... _---------

9.43

.20
.27

Competitive Strategies
Local Differentiation (LD)
Low Cost Competition (LC)

.01
.37*

Cultural Difference (CD)
Interactions
CD*L1
CD*PR
CD*LD
CD*LC
df

F
R2
AR2

N=100, *P<.05 **P<.OI ***P<.OOI

-.. 02

.56

-.00
.01

.01
.01

.09
.18

1.47

-.01
-.04*
2,97
12.32
.20

---

10.67

5,94
5.81
.24
.04

2,97
2.33
.05

---

5,94
3.37
.15
.10

9,90
4.41
.31
.16
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Table 7
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for IUR Behavior Control

Variables
Intercept
Interorganizational
Interdependence
Local Institution (Ll)
Parent Resource (PR)

Equation 1
s.e.
b.

Equation 2
b.
s.e.

Equation 3
b.
s.e

Equation 4
s.e.
b.

Equation 5
s.e.
b.

------------------

------------------

----------------

.. ----------------

----------------

42.17*** 5.81

52.19*** 9.43

33.63*** 4.30

18.91

.08
.35*

.13
.16

.36
.36

.29
.29

Competitive Strategies
Local Differentiation (LD)
Low Cost Competition (LC)

.04
.79**

Cultural Difference (CD)
Interactions
CD*Ll
CD*PR
CD*LD
CD*LC
df
F
R2
L\R2

N=100, *P<.05 **P<.OI ***P<.OOI

-.65

.79

-.01
.05*

02
02

.12
.24

---

5,94
3.96
.17
.12

2,97
6.21
.11

---

27.68

17.44

.32
-.84

.29
.43

.17
1.06

.03
.61

-.25
1.52*

.36
.65

.70

.68

-.03

.96

.02
.03

-.02
.06
.02
-.04

.02
.02
.02
.03

-.00
-.01
2,97
2.56
.05

14.71

5,94
4.81
.20
.09

9,90
3.80
.28
.08
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Table 8
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for IHR Output Control

Equation 1

Equation 2

Equation 3

Variables

b.
s.e.
-- .. _--------------

b.
s.e.
------------------

b.
s.e
----------------

b.

Intercept

28.42*** 3.73

17.61

9.13

22.81*** 3.60

6.82

Interorganizational
Interdependence
Local Institution (LI)
Parent Resource (PR)

-.01
.16

.22
.24

.19
.26

Competitive Strategies
Local Differentiation (LD)
Low Cost Competition (LC)

-.14
.50**

.08
.15

Cultural Difference (CD)

.70

.54

-.02
-.01

.01
.01

.08
.10

Interactions
CD*LI
CD*PR
CD*LD
CD*LC
df
F

-----------------

R:l
AR:l

---

5,94
1.02
.05
.02

9.29

.70

2,97
6.02
.11

---

Equation 5

b.
s.e.
----------------.11

11.91

.16
.11

.20
.30

-.07
1.01 *

.25
.44

.68

1.23*

.65

.01
.02

-.01
.00
.00
.03

.01
.02
.01
.02

-.07
.20
1.06** .40

.00
-.03
2,97
1.31
.03

N=100, *P<.05 **P<.OI ***P<.001

Equation 4
s.e.

5,94
3.27
.15
.04

9,90
1.88
.16
.01
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